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The (Lack of) Gender Dynamics of Gubernatorial Executive Orders *
YU OUYANG
Purdue University Northwest
CHLOE C. CARPENTIER
University of Tampa
ABSTRACT
How do governors utilize state executive orders to effect policy changes?
Are there differences between male and female governors? Though
various works have examined the dynamics of presidential executive
orders, few have examined how governors employ executive orders at the
state level. We present results of a pilot study on how gender influences
use of gubernatorial executive orders. Contrary to much of the literature
on gender dynamics, we find minimal differences in the ways that female
and male governors use gubernatorial executive orders. Female governors
do not appear to rely more or less on unilateral orders than do their male
colleagues. Although we do find some evidence that female governors are
less likely to issue cultural and economic executive orders than socialissue and public-health executive orders, the difference between female
and male governors across most issue areas is minimal. These results have
important implications on studies of gender dynamics, the unilateral
executive, and gubernatorial behavior.
KEY WORDS Gender Dynamics; Executive Orders; Gubernatorial Decision Making
Despite recent advances in electing female candidates at the federal and state levels, the
number of states led by female governors remains small. As of April 2017, only four
states had governors who were female: New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Rhode
Island. Overall, a total of 37 women have served as governors in 27 states. By
comparison, Congress had a total of 104 female members in 2017, with 21 in the U.S.
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Senate and 83 in the U.S. House of Representatives. Surprisingly, although multiple
works examine how gender affects elite behavior across a variety of contexts (Anzia and
Berry 2011; Dolan 2000; Dolan 2011; Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003), scant attention
has been given to the differences between male and female governors. (For an exception,
see Heidbreder and Scheurer 2012.) To help address this gap in the literature, we will
report the results of a pilot project on how gender affects the dynamics of gubernatorial
executive orders.
A better understanding of how governors employ unilateral actions at the state
level is important. A review of gubernatorial actions suggests that uses of state executive
orders are expansive. Governors have issued executive orders to address a variety of issue
areas, including healthcare policies (Gakh, Vernick, and Rutkow 2013; Schneider 1989),
consensus building and dispute resolution (Carlson 2000), antidiscrimination policies in
the workplace (Colvin 2000), gay rights (Klawitter and Flatt 1998), and policies that
affect state agencies (Ryan 1978; Woods 2004). Moreover, various studies suggest not
only that female governors prioritize certain policy areas more so than do male governors
(see, for instance, Heidbreder and Scheurer 2012; Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003) but
also that females tend to be more collaborative and to sponsor and cosponsor
significantly more legislation than do their male colleagues (Anzia and Berry 2011).
To determine whether gender influences gubernatorial behaviors, we examine
executive orders across seven states, limiting the period to 1959–2017 because of data
constraints. Contrary to existing literature on gender differences, our findings suggest that
even after controlling for situational, political, and economic factors, female governors
are not more or less prone to unilateral activity than their male colleagues. Moreover,
although we do find some evidence that female governors are less likely to issue cultural
and economic executive orders than social-issue and public-health executive orders, the
difference between female and male governors across most issue areas is minimal.
GENDER AND THE GOVERNORSHIP
Our main goal in this article is to examine whether female governors use executive orders
differently than do their fellow male governors. Though most studies on executive orders
and unilateral actions have focused on U.S. presidents (see, for instance, Bolton and
Thrower 2016; Howell 2003; Ouyang and Waterman 2015; Warber 2006), a small
number of works on gubernatorial executive orders has begun to accumulate. For
example, McLaughlin et al. (2010) reported a massive data-collection effort to create a
comprehensive public-policy database for the State of Pennsylvania, which includes state
executive orders since 1979. Similarly, Rivera and Wagner (2010) examined the
tendency of New Jersey governors to use executive orders as policy instruments.
Although insightful, these studies remain limited in that they speak to only a single
state’s propensity for executive orders.
Taking a more comprehensive approach to the study of governors and state
executive orders, Ferguson and Bowling (2008) provided an initial examination of
executive orders across 49 states from 2004 and 2005. Although they did not subject the
data to rigorous empirical tests, Ferguson and Bowling nonetheless found that executive
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orders are frequently used by governors for a variety of policy areas. More recently,
Barber, Bolton, and Thrower (2016) proposed a theory of executive unilateral policymaking that highlights inter- and intra-branch ideological conflicts. Their work suggests
that while ideological disagreements between the executive and legislative branches can
constrain unilateral actions, this constraint is contingent on low levels of legislative
polarization and a party’s ability to overcome supermajority barriers.
Surprisingly, while gubernatorial executive orders have received greater interest
in the literature, to our knowledge, no study has examined the degree to which female
governors employ unilateral authority differently than male governors. As the chief
executive of her state, a female governor is in a unique position to advance policies for
her female constituents, acting as an advocate. Moreover, by strategically using executive
orders when possible, female governors are able to overcome the many legislative
barriers that often limit policy-making. The question, however, is do they?
Scholars have devoted considerable energy to the study of gender across a mix of
contexts. The ability to take on such executive positions comes at a cost. First and
foremost, women face unique challenges in the workplace. Such women, especially those
in executive positions, are much more likely to sacrifice their personal lives in order to
maintain such positions. Compared to men in high positions, female executives are more
likely to forsake having children and are less likely to sustain personal relationships,
despite their desire to have such (Hewlett 2002). In addition, in high executive marketing
positions, females have been proven to have higher levels of ethical judgment than their
male counterparts (Akaah 1989). This possibly limits female growth within companies,
depending on their individual morality.
Second, various studies indicate that women behave differently than men. For
example, female legislators tend to prioritize different policies than do male legislators.
They tend to place higher priority on women’s rights issues, depending on their
representation in the legislature, but not on legislation that is central to the benefit of
children and families (Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003). Men and women have different
leadership styles, and when they go against stereotypical gender-related leadership
strategies, they are ineffective as leaders (Eagly and Johannsen-Schmidt 2001). Women
suffer some disadvantages from prejudicial evaluations of their competence as leaders,
especially in masculine organizational contexts if they are unable to produce masculine
traits on policies that are perceived as male-dominated. Women do have some advantages
in typical leadership style, however; for example, they are more likely to communicate
and understand as well as to provide a strong sense of community for those who are their
subordinates (Eagly and Carli 2003).
Why might female legislators emphasize different issue priorities than their male
counterparts? Works in the psychology of gender differences suggest that one reason may
be the varying level of empathy expressed by females, compared to males. In their study
of adolescents, Van der Graaff et al. (2014) found that girls are consistently more
empathetic than boys throughout their life-spans. Boys’ empathy levels, however,
fluctuate as they develop from childhood into adolescence.
Behavioral science literature also suggests further differences between females
and males. According to Juvrud and Rennels (2017), two stereotypical pathways
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influence help-seeking behavior among both men and women: the attitudinal pathway
and the personally endorsed pathway. The attitudinal pathway is the idea that an
individual’s beliefs about others influence that person’s own gender identity. The
personally endorsed pathway represents the notion that an individual experiences interest
in a person, object, or event before the individual’s gender identity is set in stone. Results
indicate that the personally endorsed gender stereotype predicts the extent to which
women seek help, whereas both attitudinal and personally endorsed gender stereotypes
predict male help-seeking behaviors.
Perhaps reflecting the innate differences between genders, the public—via the
media—perceive important gender differences between men and women. For one, gender
gap is especially prominent in the media coverage of female candidates: Women are
more likely to receive more gender-related coverage, especially when running for high
offices (Meeks 2012). This indicates that female politicians running for high office have
less salient issue-dominated media coverage, because the media focuses on their gender;
however, women gain a strategic advantage when they run “as women,” stressing issues
that voters associate favorably with female candidates and targeting female voters
(Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes 2003).
Gender perceptions also affect both peer and self-evaluations of female managers.
Men rate themselves as more effective than women rate themselves (Paustian-Underdahl,
Walker, and Woehr 2014). Women and older managers are less inclined to define career
success in terms of hierarchical and financial progression, as they are more likely to have
individual value-based ideas about what success in a career amounts to (Sturges 1999).
Ratings by subordinates within various companies indicate that female and male
executives engaged in greater amounts of leader behavior valued by top management
than by the typical employee. Female middle managers and executives were rated higher
when compared to their male counterparts in interpersonal, goal-driven, and task-oriented
leadership styles (Bartol, Martin, and Kromkowski, 2003).
Gender stereotypes affect how voters search for information of female and male
candidates for office. Voters seek more competence-based information about female
candidates than they do for male candidates, in addition to seeking increased information
related to “compassion issues.” Statistical analysis provides evidence that female
candidates are disadvantaged in the Democratic Party; Republican women are still at a
disadvantage in elections, however. Overall, voters seek out more competency-based
information on female candidates, especially Republicans (Ditonto, Hamilton, and
Redlawsk 2014).
Although many studies indicate that females behave differently than their male
counterparts, some suggest otherwise. Using analyzed speeches, Herrera and Shafer
(2011) have found evidence that there is no difference in policy agenda between male and
female governors, although their study did find that male governors are slightly more
likely than females to address education in speeches. They also found that male
governors were covered more by the media in social and welfare issues than were female
governors. In contrast, Ferrara (2012) found that there is no difference in the policy
agenda of male and female governors. This may imply that the greater the office, the less
divergent the agendas because of institutional restraints.
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Analysis controlling for gender and political party again found that female
Democratic governors prioritize some policy areas differently than their male
counterparts do but that in other areas, their policy agendas are identical; however, there
were no identifiable policy differences based on gender among Republican governors
(Shafer and Herrera 2010). Female governors in general perceived a double standard
applied to their leadership: They received less support from their colleagues within their
political parties, as well as more criticism and inequitable coverage from media. All
women in another study reported an inability to discuss gender-related leadership issues
for fear of handicapping their administrations and being perceived as lesser leaders
(Havens 2012).
Debate on whether, and the extent to which, gender differences exist also extends
to work in psychological sciences. In neuropsychology and cognitive development, for
instance, scholars remain conflicted about whether a gender gap exists. According to
Ardila et al. (2011), only minimal, statistically insignificant, gender differences exist
during cognitive development. These cognitive differences that result from gender show
up in only a small number of tests and account for a low percentage of score variance. In
comparison, Yeo et al. (2016) suggest that women display higher verbal ability, which
entails understanding commands, language expression, and language comprehension;
meanwhile, men have a higher spatial ability, which entails being able to comprehend
verbal-spatial terms, such as directions, and recognizing objects at various angles. These
results overall are statistically insignificant, however, meaning that there is little
psychological difference.
Taken together, it is not immediately clear whether female governors will utilize
unilateral actions differently than men will. Although scholars note that female governors
have different policy interests and emphasize policy agendas in their State of the State
addresses (Heidbreder and Scheurer 2012), there is evidence that women in executive
leadership positions tend to govern and behave similarly to men in the same positions. To
this point, a statement by Bev Perdue, North Carolina’s first female governor, is
illustrative: “Although I will go down in history as North Carolina’s first female
governor, I want to make history as a governor who faced the challenges and made the
right decisions to position North Carolina for a competitive global future” (Quoted in
Heidbreder and Scheurer 2012). As Governor Perdue’s statement makes clear, although
she recognizes the importance of being the state’s first female governor, she intends to
govern as the chief executive first and as a female second. The important question here is
whether these sentiments are unique to Governor Perdue or are common among other
female executives. Specifically, we ask, “Are female governors more active unilaterally
than male governors? Do they prioritize different policies unilaterally?” In the following
sections, we explore these questions.
DATA AND METHODS
To explore the differences, if any, between male and female governors and their uses of
unilateral authority at the state level, we collected data on gubernatorial executive orders
for Arizona (Jan. 1965–Jan. 2017), New Hampshire (Jan. 1991–Dec. 2016), New Mexico
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(Jan. 2011–Dec. 2016), Oklahoma (Nov. 1959–Nov. 2016), Oregon (Feb. 2003–ept.
2016), Rhode Island (Jan. 1973–Jan. 2017), and South Carolina (Mar. 1973–Oct. 2016).
The appendix provides greater details on the states and governors within the data set.
Although these seven states represent only a small portion of all gubernatorial executive
orders in the 50 states, they were selected to maximize variations in state contexts.
First, in all seven states, a female either was the sitting governor or had recently
served as governor at the time of the study. Currently, four states have female governors:
Rhode Island (Gina Raimondo–D), New Mexico (Susana Martinez–R), Oregon (Kate
Brown–D), and Oklahoma (Mary Fallin–R). Margaret “Maggie” Hassan–D (New
Hampshire) left the governor’s office to become a U.S. senator, and Nikki Haley–R
(South Carolina) was appointed by President Trump to the post of U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations.
Second, authorization for executive orders differs across states. Although
governors in all 50 states are authorized to issue executive orders, the basis for those
gubernatorial orders may vary. For instance, based on an October 2015 survey of
governors’ offices by the Council of State Government (Council of State Government
2016), whereas governors of Arizona and Oregon are authorized to issue executive
orders based on implied powers, the governors of New Hampshire and South Carolina
have statutory authorizations for executive orders. The governor of New Mexico can
issue orders on the basis of the state constitution and state statutes. Oklahoma
governors are granted the authority by the state constitution to issue executive orders,
and Rhode Island governors can issue executive orders based on state statutes, implied
powers, and case laws.
The main dependent variable in this study is the number of executive orders
issued monthly. In addition to gender (our main variable of interest), we also account for
a number of factors that may affect the level of unilateral activities at the state level. First,
we include a set of variables to account for differences across governors and the
transitions across administrations. Studies in executive unilateralism at the federal level
have long recognized that Democratic and Republican presidents utilize executive orders
differently (see, for instance, Howell and Lewis 2002; Ouyang and Waterman 2015). We
thus include a dummy variable for whether a Democratic governor is currently in office.
We also add dummy variables for whether the governor is in the first six and the last six
months of her term, as transition periods and the first several months of a new
administration mark critical junctures as the state transitions from one administration to
another (Sherwood and Chackerian 1988).
The extent to which governors use executive orders may depend on political
contexts. In his formal treatment of executive orders, Howell (2003) suggests that
presidents are more likely to act unilaterally when seeking to preempt legislature actions
or when Congress is poised to enact policies that diverge considerably from the
presidents’ preferences. Scholars find similar results at the state level. For instance,
Clarke (1998) finds that divided government and polarization affect budgetary conflicts
between governors and legislatures. Thus, we include variables for party polarization in
the lower (house) and upper (senate) chambers of the state legislature, divided
government, and the percentage of legislators within the governor’s party.

Ouyang and Carpentier Gubernatorial Executive Orders 105

Third, we account for the extent to which state economic conditions may affect
unilateral actions by governors. Studies on vote intentions indicate that voters may
employ a retrospective evaluation of the state’s economic conditions when casting votes
for the governor’s office (Partin 1995). To the extent that governors recognize the
importance of the economy on vote choice during election time, they may be apt to
employ unilateral strategies during economic downturns. To account for such possibility,
we include controls for gross state product and state unemployment rate. Last, we control
for total state population to account for variations in size of the states.
STATISTICAL FINDINGS
Table 1 presents the results of random effects negative binomial regression models,
which account for the hierarchical structure and over dispersion in the data. The
dependent variable in each case is the number of executive orders issued monthly. Each
model contains a binary variable for gender, as well as the lagged total number of
executive orders to account for autocorrelations. In addition, each model also includes
fixed indicators for states to account for further state variations not included in the model.
The Governors Model (Model 1) is the simplest model and includes variables to indicate
whether a Democratic governor is currently in office, the last six months of the
governor’s administration, the first six months of the administration, and the total months
that the governor has served in office. The Political Model (Model 2) adds controls for
political divisions and polarization in state legislatures. The State Model (Model 3) adds
controls to account for state economic conditions. Finally, the Full Model (Model 4)
combines all variables from Models 1–3.
Overall, we find no differences in the use of gubernatorial executive orders by
female vs. male governors (Model 4). Our main variable (a binary indicator for female) is
statistically significant in only the Governors Model. Controlling solely for whether a
Democratic governor is currently in office, for their first and last six months office, and
for how long the governor has been in office, we find that female governors issue a
greater number of executive orders than their male counterparts;however, this
relationship between gender and the level of executive orders disappears when we
include additional controls for state political and economic contexts.
Use of executive orders also relates to the timing of an administration. Governors
are especially active during the beginning of administrations, issuing about four times as
many executive orders during the first six months, compared to all other moments of their
administrations. This is consistent with studies in the unilateral presidency, which
suggests that presidents may issue a greater number of executive orders during the first
and last years of their administrations as they seek to undo and change actions by their
predecessors (for incoming presidents) or to further solidify their policy agendas before
leaving office (for outgoing administrations). Although we find evidence that governors
are more active unilaterally during the beginning months of their administrations, we find
no evidence that governors make last-ditch attempts at unilateral behavior as they prepare
to leave office.
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Table 1. Models for “Female Governors Do Not Issue a Greater Number of
Executive Orders”
Governors
(1)
.37***
(.06)

Political
(2)
–.05
(.16)

State
(3)
.09
(.10)

Full
(4)
.05
(.17)

Democratic
governor

–.13*
(.05)

.28*
(.11)

.05
(.05)

.27*
(.13)

Last 6 months

.14+
(.08)

.12
(.13)

.16+
(.09)

.12
(.13)

First 6 months

1.43***
(.09)

1.48***
(.12)

1.44***
(.09)

1.40***
(.12)

Months in office

–.03***
(0.00)

–.03***
(0.00)

–.03***
(0.00)

–.03***
(0.00)

Female

Party polarization
(house)

–1.05**
(.41)

–.61
(.55)

Party polarization
(senate)

.84*
(.34)

.88*
(.39)

Divided
government

–.26+
(.15)

–.12
(.15)

% of legislators in
governor’s party

–.01
(.01)

0.00
(.01)

State population
(log)

–.75**
(.27)

–4.43**
(1.64)

Gross state product
(log)

.47***
(.07)

.88*
(.38)

% state
unemployment

–.01
(.01)

.04+
(.02)

New Hampshire

.47
(.45)

–1.08+
(.61)

–.28
(.57)

–6.01**
(2.00)

New Mexico

–.51+
(.30)

.82
(.70)

–1.03*
(.41)

–3.01+
(1.58)

–2.17***
(.20)

–2.84***
(.45)

–2.46***
(.23)

–3.78***
(.54)

Oklahoma

Concluded next page
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Table 1. Models for “Female Governors Do Not Issue a Greater Number of
Executive Orders,” concl.
Governors
(1)
.73*
(.34)

Political
(2)
.30
(.52)

State
(3)
.26
(.42)

Full
(4)
–1.22+
(.69)

Rhode Island

.28
(.20)

–.07
(.61)

–.36
(.36)

–4.95**
(1.88)

South Carolina

–.26
(.18)

.13
(.37)

–.27
(.19)

–.28
(.39)

# of EOs issued
(lag 1)

.13***
(.01)

.07***
(.01)

.12***
(.01)

.07***
(.01)

–2.41***
(.15)

–.54
(.77)

.68
(3.06)

49.88*
(19.85)

1.20*
(.58)

1.68*
(.72)

1.22*
(.60)

1.65*
(.73)

1.23*
(.60)
2901
7
71
684
–4081.07
8192.15
8281.74

1.33+
(.71)
1089
7
11
228
–1615.14
3268.29
3363.16

1.17+
(.62)
2688
7
47
612
–3690.21
7416.42
7522.56

1.29+
(.72)
1089
7
11
228
–1608.89
3261.78
3371.63

Oregon

Constant
ln(r)
Constant
ln(s)
Constant
Obs.
# of Groups
Min. group obs.
Max. group obs.
Log-likelihood
AIC
BIC

Notes: Random effects negative binomial models fitted.
The dependent variable in all four models is the number of gubernatorial executive orders issued
(monthly).
Standard errors in parentheses.
Arizona omitted.
AIC=Akaike information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion; EO=executive order;
obs.=observation.
p < 0.1

+

*p < 0.05

**p < 0.01

***p < 0.001

Consistent with results from study of the unilateral presidency (Ouyang and
Waterman 2015), we find that the level of executive unilateralism is related to ideology.
We find that Democratic governors issue more executive orders than do Republicans.
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Controlling for variations in political and economic contexts, the Full Model indicates
that, on average, Democratic governors issue nearly twice as many executive orders
than do Republican governors.
We find only weak relations between political contexts and unilateral
behavior. Results from the Full Model suggest that the presence of divided
government is not related to the number of executive orders issued monthly. Although
party polarization in the legislature is related to executive actions by the governor, it
is limited to polarization in the senate, excluding the house. This is somewhat
surprising, given that model-fit statistics indicate that the Political Model (not
including controls for economic conditions) does nearly as good a job in predicting
monthly executive orders activity as the Full Model does. Although fully assessing
the relationship between political polarization and executive orders is beyond the
scope of this article, recent evidence from other works suggest that the extent to
which ideological polarization relates to exercise of executive order is more nuanced
than presented here (Barber et al. 2016).
Regarding the effect of economic conditions influencing executive orders at
the state level, there are mixed results. Based on studies of economic retrospective
evaluations and vote intentions, we suspected that governors may attempt to use
unilateral directives to act quickly during economic downturns in the face of
legislative gridlocks. All else being equal, we find that governors issue a greater
number of executive orders as the gross state product increases and as state
unemployment rate raises, respectively. This is perplexing, as it suggests that
governors issue more executive orders when economic conditions in the state improve
and when the economy worsens.1 Although we cannot fully ascertain why this is the
case, we suspect that one possible explanation is the limited number of states included
in our data set.
It may be the case that gender differences and executive orders become
apparent only when we examine across policy areas. For instance, (Heidbreder and
Scheurer (2012) find that female governors prioritize social-welfare policies in their
State of the State speeches, compared to male governors. Using data on all Rhode
Island executive orders from 1973 to 2017, we examine whether female governors use
executive orders to emphasize certain issues areas more than others.
Rhode Island executive orders present a unique case suitable for assessing
executive orders across policy areas. In addition to making all executive order
publicly available via the Secretary of State’s website, Rhode Island codes each
executive order in relation to the policy it addresses. For our purpose, the original
policy areas provided are too specific: Rhode Island provides coding for a total of 98
policy areas, with some policy areas containing only one or two executive orders. We
recoded these 98 issues into seven more-manageable areas of policy focus: (1) state
government and administration, (2) transportation and infrastructure, (3) environment
and natural resources, (4) law and public safety, (5) economy, (6) social issues and
public health, and (7) culture. For example, executive orders dealing with airports,
boats, bridges, and highways were recoded into a single category that we denote as
transportation and infrastructure.

0.12
-0.49

–14.57***
-0.92
–3.19***
-0.42

.48*
-0.2
–.34
-0.43
–.79***
-0.17
811
0.006
999.36
1018.16

Last 6 months

First 6 months

Constant

pseudo R 2
AIC
BIC

–.71***
-0.21
–.51
-0.36

–.40
-0.41

–.06
-0.58

0.07
-0.43

0.17
-0.14

0.015
2749
2781.89

–.65*
-0.33
811

0.37
-0.54

–.43**
-0.17

0.13
-0.34

–.05
-0.3

–.89***
-0.06

1.04+
-0.6

–1.78*
-0.73

0.11
-0.15

0.07
-0.21

p < 0.1

+

*p < 0.05

**p < 0.01

***p < 0.001

AIC=Akaike information criterion; BIC=Bayesian information criterion.

Standard errors in parentheses.

Notes: Baseline category for the multinomial regression is social-issues and public-health executive orders.

N

–.32
-0.4

0.35
-0.44

–.09
-0.19

Democratic
governor

0.04
-0.22

–.84
-0.84

0.05
-0.17

–13.65*** –1.18***
-1.35
-0.23

Culture

–2.03***
-0.23

0.34
-0.64

–15.38***
-0.78

0.31
-0.31

0.47
-0.37

Multinomial Logistic Regression
Economy Environment Law & Order Government Infrastructure
(6)

Raimondo

Social Issues &
Public Health
(5)

Table 2. Variations in Unilateral Activism across Issue Areas
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Before discussing the results of our examination, we want to acknowledge one
limitation of the data and results presented here. Although executive orders presented
here span 1973–2017 and were issued by a mixture of both Democratic and Republican
governors, only a single female governor, Gina Raimondo, is in the data set. In essence,
then, we compare whether Governor Raimondo prioritized different policy areas in her
executive orders in relation to her male predecessors. Although this limits our ability to
generalize to other cases, we nonetheless find some evidence that female governors do
prioritize some policy areas more than others.
Table 2 presents the results of two models assessing the gubernatorial executive
orders across different policy areas, including social issues and public health, culture,
economy, environment, law and order, government, and infrastructure.2 The unit of
analysis here is a single executive order. Model 5 reports the results of a logistic
regression model. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the executive order relates to
social issues and public health; otherwise, it is coded 0. Model 6 reports the results of a
multinomial regression. The omitted baseline comparison category is social issues and
public health.
Overall, we find that Governor Raimondo was not more likely to issue more
social and public-health executive order than were her male counterparts (Model 5),
though she was less likely to use her unilateral authority to address cultural and economic
issues than on social issues. Contrary to existing works, we find no evidence that female
governors are more likely to issue social-issue executive orders (Model 5). Although
governors in general are more likely to issue social-issue executive orders during the last
six months of their administrations (as they prepare to leave office), female governors
overall are not more active in this policy area. Comparing our results to those indicating
that female governors will devote more attention to social issues in their State of the State
addresses (Heidbreder and Scheurer 2012), this suggests that political rhetoric does not
necessarily translate into policy action.
Compared to social-issue executive orders and her male predecessors, however,
we found that Governor Raimondo issued significantly fewer executive orders on cultural
and economic issues. For instance, Governor Raimondo was three times less likely to
issue an economic executive order than social and public-health executive orders. In sum,
though we find some evidence that Raimondo prioritized certain issues less than social
issues (cultural and economic), the results overall suggest minimal differences between
Raimondo and fellow male governors when it comes to social policies.
CONCLUSION
Over past decades, the number of females holding the highest executive offices in states
has steadily increased, and women are now regularly in contention for governors’
mansions. This rise of females in the chief executive offices across states has not resulted
in a similar increase in research on female governors, however. Furthermore, although
existing studies point to how gender affects the behavior of female legislators, it is
unclear whether gender affects governors and gubernatorial executive orders.
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To fill this gap in literature about state politics and governors, our research
addresses whether gender affects unilateral policy-making at the state level. Contrary to
much of the existing work on gender dynamics, we find little to no evidence that female
governors use their unilateral authority differently than do their male colleagues. Female
governors do not issue more executive orders, nor do they seem to use executive orders
for traditionally women’s-rights issues.
Our analysis indicates the importance of additional work in this area. Given the
amount of literature indicating that female political elites differ from their male
colleagues in important ways, we are surprised that we find no gender differences. As
females continue to become more competitive in elections for top executive positions in
the states, it is essential that we better understand the extent to which gender influences
gubernatorial policy-making.
Our pilot study is an important first step in understanding the nature of state-level
executive orders and gender differences in the governor’s office. Of course, as with many
studies, our results also raise many questions. For example, why do we find that
governors issue more executive orders both as the gross state product increases and as
state unemployment rate increases? One possibility is that the static measures of
economic performance that we used in the models are too general to pick the subtleties of
the relationship between gubernatorial orders and the economy. A second potential
explanation is that although both gross state product and state unemployment rate
measure economic conditions, they are fundamentally different concepts. It is possible
that governors utilize executive orders both to grow the state’s economy during times of
distress (unemployment rate) and to continue to invoke their executive authority to
further expand the economy as conditions improve (gross state product). Although fully
assessing this issue is beyond the scope of this article, we will explore these possibilities
in future projects.
More intriguing is the null relationship that we find between gender and executive
authority. In contrast to multiple studies showing that female political elites exhibit
different policy preferences and behaviors compared to their male counterparts, we find
little evidence suggesting that female governors employ executive authority differently
than male governors do. One potential explanation is the limited number of female
governors included in this study. Though we made a concerted effort to include
governors (both female and males) from states with diverse political and economic
conditions, our data set includes data from only seven states. In a follow-up study, we
intend to expand our data set to include all 50 states.
An alternative explanation is that gender is not a meaningful explanation for how
governors utilize executive orders—, our results from a limited sample of states is
generalizable to gubernatorial executive power in general. Instead, the extent to which
governors employ executive orders is a function of state-level variations in gubernatorial
power. In a later project, leveraging new developments in measuring gubernatorial power
(see Krupnikov and Shipan 2012), we plan to assess how the scope of the governor’s
formal power affects unilateral decision making at the statelevel.

112 Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences Vol. 21 (2018)

ENDNOTES
1. It is possible that had we used dynamic measures of economic performance, such as
the growth of the gross state product and of unemployment rate, rather than the static
versions in the analyses, we would have found a stronger relationship between
economic variables and the use of gubernatorial executive orders. As the effect of
economic factors on unilateral executive behavior is not the main focus of this article,
however, our static measures of the economy are sufficient for a pilot project such as
this. In any case, we do elaborate on these possibilities and on our next steps in this
research agenda in the conclusion section.
2. Because of data limitation, the analyses reported in this section contain executive
orders only from Rhode Island. Also because of limited data, we cannot include any
of the additional control variables shown in Table 1 here in the logistic and
multinomial logistic models.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Descriptions of Variables in Analyses
Variable Name
Female
Democratic governor

Description
Coded 1 if governor is female
Coded 1 if governor is a Democrat
Coded 1 for a governor’s last 6 months in
Last 6 months
office
Coded 1 for a governor’s first 6 months in
First 6 months
office
Months in office
# of months a governor has been in office
Party polarization
Ideological distance between party medians
(house)
(lower chamber)
Party polarization
Ideological distance between party medians
(senate)
(upper chamber)
Coded 1 if all three institutions of state
Divided government
government are not controlled by same party
Average percent of legislators across the two
% of legislators in
chambers of the legislature who are members
governor’s party
of the governor’s party
State population (log)
Log of total state population
Gross state product (log) Log of gross state product (in thousands)
% state unemployment
State unemployment rate

Source
Compiled by authors
Compiled by authors
Compiled by authors
Compiled by authors
Compiled by authors
Shor and McCarty
(2011)
Shor and McCarty
(2011)
Klarner (2013)
Klarner (2013)
Klarner (2015)
Klarner (2015)
Klarner (2015)

Table A2. Arizona Governors in Date Range Covered (Apr. 1965–Jan. 2017)
Governor
Samuel P. Goddard
Jack R. Williams
Raul H. Castro

Party
Democrat
Republican
Democrat

Female
No
No
No

Entered Office
January 4, 1965
January 2, 1967
January 6, 1975

Left Office
January 2, 1967
January 6, 1975
October 20, 1977
Concluded next page
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Table A2. Arizona Governors in Date Range Covered (Apr. 1965–Jan. 2017), concl.
Governor
Wesley Bolin
Bruce Babbitt
Evan Mecham
Rose Mofford
Fife Symington
Jane Dee Hull
Janet Napolitano
Jane Brewer
Doug Ducey

Party
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican

Female
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Entered Office
October 20, 1977
March 4, 1978
January 5, 1987
April 4, 1988
March 6, 1991
September 5, 1997
January 6, 2003
January 21, 2009
January 5, 2015

Left Office
March 4, 1978
January 5, 1987
April 4, 1988
March 6, 1991
September 5, 1997
January 6, 2003
January 21, 2009
January 5, 2015
Incumbent

Table A3. List of New Hampshire Governors in Date Range Covered (Jan. 1991–
Dec. 2016)
Governor
Judd Gregg
Ralph D. Hough
Stephen Merrill
Jeanne Shaheen
Craig Benson
John Lynch
Margaret Hassan

Party
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Democrat

Female
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes

Entered Office
January 4, 1989
January 2, 1993
January 7, 1993
January 9, 1997
January 9, 2003
January 6, 2005
January 3, 2013

Left Office
January 2, 1993
January 7, 1993
January 9, 1997
January 9, 2003
January 6, 2005
January 3, 2013
January 2, 2017

Table A4. New Mexico Governors in Date Range Covered (Jan. 2011–Dec. 2016)
Governor
Susana Martinez

Party
Republican

Female Entered Office
Yes
January 1, 2011

Left Office
Incumbent
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Table A5. Oklahoma Governors in Date Range Covered (Nov. 1959–Nov. 2016)
Governor
J. Howard
Edmondson
George Nigh
Henry Bellmon
Dewey F. Bartlett
David Hall
David L. Boren
George Nigh
Henry Bellmon
David Walters
Frank Keating
Brad Henry
Mary Fallin

Party

Female

Entered Office

Left Office

Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

January 12, 1959
January 6, 1963
January 14, 1963
January 9, 1967
January 11, 1971
January 13, 1975
January 8, 1979
January 12, 1987
January 14, 1991
January 9, 1995
January 13, 2003
January 10, 2011

January 6, 1963
January 14, 1963
January 9, 1967
January 11, 1971
January 13, 1975
January 8, 1979
January 12, 1987
January 14, 1991
January 9, 1995
January 13, 2003
January 10, 2011
Incumbent

Table A6. Oregon Governors in Date Range Covered (Feb. 2003–Sept. 2016)
Governor
Ted Kulongoski
John Kitzhaber
Kate Brown

Party
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat

Female
No
No
Yes

Entered Office
January 13, 2003
January 10, 2011
February 18, 2015

Left Office
January 10, 2011
February 18, 2015
Incumbent

Table A7. Rhode Island Governors in Date Range Covered (Jan. 1973–Jan. 2017)
Governor
Philip W. Noel
J. Joseph Garrahy
Edward D. DiPrete
Bruce Sundlun
Lincoln C. Almond
Donald Carcieri
Lincoln Chafee
Gina Raimondo

Party
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat

Female
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

Entered Office
January 2, 1973
January 4, 1977
January 1, 1985
January 1, 1991
January 3, 1995
January 7, 2003
January 4, 2011
January 6, 2015

Left Office
January 4, 1977
January 1, 1985
January 1, 1991
January 3, 1995
January 7, 2003
January 4, 2011
January 6, 2015
Incumbent
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Table A8. South Carolina Governors in Date Range Covered (Mar. 1973–Oct. 2016)
Governor
John West
James Edwards
Richard Riley
Carroll Campbell
David Beasley
Jim Hodges
Mark Sanford
Nikki Haley

Party
Democrat
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
Republican

Female
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

Entered Office
January 19, 1971
January 21, 1975
January 10, 1979
January 14, 1987
January 11, 1995
January 13, 1999
January 15, 2003
January 12, 2011

Left Office
January 21, 1975
January 10, 1979
January 14, 1987
January 11, 1995
January 13, 1999
January 15, 2003
January 12, 2011
January 24, 2017

